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PUT THIS IN YOUR PIPE AND SMOKE IT:
FDA REGULATION OF TOBACCO PRODUCTS
I. INTRODUCTION

On August 10, 1995, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), upon
instructions from President Clinton, announced proposals for regulating
the tobacco industry.'
The FDA's proposals came in the wake of
allegations that tobacco companies have long known about the addictive

quality of cigarettes. 2

The proposed regulations were supported by

members of Congress who suspected that tobacco companies intend
smokers to become addicted to cigarettes through marketing efforts
directed toward teenagers, and through the companies' manipulation of
nicotine levels in tobacco.3 Final rules were issued on August 28, 1996.1
Specifically, the FDA rules address the problem of teenage smoking

by restricting marketing techniques that, according to the agency,
contribute to higher rates of youth tobacco use.'
The following
provisions are included among the rules: (1) cigarette vending machines
will be outlawed;6 (2) cigarette advertisements will be prohibited outdoors
within 1000 feet of schools and playgrounds; 7 (3) permitted outdoor
advertising may only be in black-and-white text;' (4) free samples, self1. Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless
Tobacco Products to Protect Children and Adolescents, 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314 (1995)
(proposed Aug. 11, 1995); see also Nicotine Attack: Cigarette Regulation is Formally
Proposed, Industry Sues to Halt It, WVALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 1995, at Al [hereinafter
Nicotine Attack].
2. Nicotine Attack, supra note 1.
3. Seeid.
4. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless
Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396 (1996) (codified at
21 C.F.R. §§ 801, 803-804, 807, 820, 897 (1997)).
5. See Nicotine Attack, supra note 1.
6. See 21 C.F.R. § 897.14(c).
7. See id. § 897.30(b). Recently, the FDA rules restricting the advertising and
promotion of cigarettes were struck down in Coyne Beahm, Inc., v. FDA, 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 5453, at *74 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 1997). Thus, whether the rules
regarding advertising and promotion will ultimately be in force remains to be seen, as
the FDA intends to appeal this portion the of District Court's decision. See Dominic
Bencivenga, Tobacco Litigation: StrategiesReflectLessonsLearnedover 40 Years, N.Y.
L.J., May 1, 1997, at 5; see also infra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
8. See 21 C.F.R. § 897.32(a); see also discussion supra note 7; infra notes 12-14
and accompanying text.
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service displays, and mail orders will be barred;9 (5) products such as
caps and gym bags that contain cigarette advertising may not be sold or
given away;' and (6) brand-name sponsorship of sporting or
entertainment events will be prohibited."1
When the FDA first proposed its rules, the tobacco industry, along
with advertising trade groups, quickly struck back by filing a lawsuit
against the FDA in federal district court in Greensboro, North
Carolina.'" On April 25, 1997, the court in Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA
ruled that the FDA may regulate the access and distribution of tobacco
products, but not their advertising and promotion.' 3 The issue of the
FDA's ability to regulate tobacco products, however, is still in
controversy-both the tobacco industry and the FDA intend to appeal the
Coyne Beahm decision.' 4
Many arguments have been advanced regarding the FDA's ability to
regulate tobacco products. For example, opponents of regulation claim
the FDA does not have jurisdiction to regulate cigarettes because cigarettes
are not marketed with the intent to cause physiological effects on the
body.5 Advertising groups also claim that the regulations would violate
the Constitution's protection of commercial speech.16
Proponents of the regulations claim that the FDA may assert
jurisdiction over tobacco products because it has broad discretion over
9. See 21 C.F.R. § 897.16(d).
10. See id. § 897.34(a); see also discussion supra note 7; infra notes 12-14 and
accompanying text..
11. See 21 C.F.R. § 897.34(c); see also discussionsupra note 7; infra notes 12-14
and accompanying text. Section 897.29 of the Proposed Rules contained an additional

provision which required the tobacco industry to contribute $150 million annually to
campaigns to curb teenage tobacco use. This provision was abandoned in the final rules.
See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless
Tobacco Products to Protect Children and Adolescents, 60 Fed. Reg. 41,328 (1995)
(proposed Aug. 11, 1995).

12. See Wade Lambert & Milo Geyelin, FDA's Planned Tobacco-Ad Rules Spur
Suits over Agency's Powers, WALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 1995, at B6.
13. See Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5453 (M.D.N.C. April

25, 1997).
14. See Bencivenga, supra note 7.

15. See discussion infra Parts II, H1.
16. As noted, the Coyne Beahm court sided in favor of the advertising groups. See
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5453, at *74; see also Lambert & Geyelin, supra note 12. A
discussion of constitutional issues arising from the proposal to regulate cigarette
advertising is beyond the scope of this note.
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which substances it exercises its regulatory powers, 17 and that courts
must show deference to the FDA's judgment."
While cigarettes could conceivably be regulated as a drug, the FDA
does not formally assert jurisdiction over tobacco products on this basis
in its latest rules.19 Rather, the agency is relying on a little-used section
of the Medical Device Amendments of 19761 (MDA) to promulgate
regulations concerning the advertising, sale, and other aspects of tobacco
products. Proponents claim cigarettes may be regulated as a "medical
device" under the MDA because cigarettes are designed to administer a
drug to the body, and thus meet the provisions of the MDA. 2
Critics fear that once tobacco comes under the jurisdiction of the
FDA, it would have to be completely banned because a drug regulated by
the FDA must be "safe for its intended use." ' Most observers agree
that tobacco products cannot meet this test. Despite this shortcoming, the
FDA claims that tobacco would not be subject to
an outright ban if
3
regulated as a medical device instead of as a drug.
This note will provide an analysis of several ways by which the FDA
could conceivably assert jurisdiction over tobacco products, and offer
some alternatives to the rules promulgated by the FDA. Part II will
discuss the history of Congressional and FDA drug classification, as well
as case law upholding previous FDA decisions to refrain from regulating
tobacco as a drug. Part III will discuss the feasibility of classifying
tobacco as a drug in light of today's increased knowledge of tobacco's
substantial health risks. Part IV will discuss the feasibility of classifying
tobacco as a medical device. Finally, Part V will endorse a modified
version of what had already been proposed to Congress in the spring of
1993 to curb teenage smoking: The Fairness in Tobacco and Nicotine
Regulation Act.24
Specifically, this note will advocate the position that all existing
methods by which the FDA seeks to regulate cigarettes rely on tenuous
authority. The FDA would be required to boldly broaden its own
previously well-defined boundaries of drug and device regulation in order
17. See Milo Geyelin, Does FDA's Power Extend to Cigarettes?, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 4, 1995, at B7.
18. See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 553 (1979).
19. See Claudia MacLachlan, FDA DrawsFirstin Tobacco Wars, NAT'L L.J., Aug.
28, 1995, at Al.
20. 21 U.S.C. § 360i(a) (1994).
21. See MacLachlan, supra note 19, at A21.
22. See id.

23. See id.
24. H.R. 2147, 103rd Cong. (1993).
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to regulate tobacco as a drug or medical device. Also, despite the FDA's
assertion to the contrary, tobacco products face nearly as great a
likelihood of being removed from the market under the the agency's
device authorities as under its drug authorities. To avoid inherent
problems of FDA regulation of tobacco under the current regulatory
scheme, Congress should explicitly define parameters by which the FDA,
or another administration, could regulate tobacco products.
II. CIGARETTES AS DRUGS
Many advocates of tobacco regulation, including former FDA
Commissioner David Kessler, believe that new evidence regarding the
dangers of tobacco use, as well as recent allegations that cigarette
manufacturers resort to nicotine alteration and misleading advertising to
bolster sales of their products, make it possible for the FDA to regulate
tobacco as a "drug."' Recent findings indicate that most smokers begin
their habit during adolescence and that teenage smoking is on the rise,26
and evidence suggests that a great deal of tobacco advertising targets
teenagers. 27 In addition, there is increased recognition that nicotine is
addictive and that "'all currently marketed cigarettes' contain 'addicting
amounts of nicotine.'" ' However, at this time, only an outside advisory
panel to the FDA has concluded that cigarettes are addictive, 29 although
evidence of tobacco's addictive qualities has existed for a considerable
amount of time.3" Though it is possible that cigarettes may be classified
25. See Suein L. Hwang et al., FDA Seeks to Mount Attack on Smoking by Minors
That CouldMean Regulation, WALL ST. J., July 13, 1995, at A3. While the latest FDA
rules do not attempt to regulate cigarettes as a drug, experts believe that drug

classification is one possible way to regulate tobacco. See supra note 19 and
accompanying text. Thus, it is not outside the scope of this note to discuss drug
classification, as well as "medical device" classification, of cigarettes.
26. See Nicotine Attack, supra note 1.
27. See id.
28. Id.
29. See Geyelin, supra note 17.

However, on March 21, 1997, shortly before

publication of this note, Liggett Group, Inc., one of the country's five largest cigarette
makers, was the first of such companies to admit that smoking is addictive and causes
cancer. See John M. Broder, Breaking Ranks: The Overview; CigaretteMaker Concedes
Smoking Can Cause Cancer, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1997, at Al.
30. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERvS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES
OF SMOKING: NICOTINE ADDICTION - A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL i (1988)
[hereinafter SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT].
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as a drug when there is a formal finding that the product is addictive,3"
it is still not clear whether cigarettes would then automatically be
classified as drugs. In order for cigarettes to be classified as drugs,
tobacco manufacturers must make assertions that cigarettes produce
medically beneficial, or pharmacological, effects on the body.32 The
following sections discuss the"history of the FDA's definition of "drug"
under the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act,33 and how drug classification
relates to both assertions made by manufacturers and the intended use of
a product by consumers.
A. The Statutory Definition
The first definition of "drug" was adopted in the Federal Food and
Drug Act of 1906.11 In that statute, "drug" was defined as "all
medicines and preparations recognized in the United States Pharmacopoeia
or National Formulary for internal or external use, and any substance or
mixture of substances intended to be used for the cure, mitigation, or
prevention of disease of either man or other animals."" One problem
central to the 1906 definition of "drug" was that it became difficult to
control cosmetics,3 6 mechanical devices,37 and fraudulent remedies for
obesity38 because such contraptions or remedies were not necessarily
used for the prevention of "disease," nor were many of them listed in the
Pharmacopoeia or National Formulary.39 In addition, the 1906 definition
did not allow the FDA jurisdiction over products intended merely to
31. See Michael S. Burkhard & M. Allison Despard, Cigarette Classification a
Burning Issue, 6 LoY. CONSUMER L. REP. 116, 119-20 (1994).

32. See discussion infra Parts II.A-B.
33. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C) (1995).
34. Federal Food and Drug Act, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (current version at
21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (1995)).
35. Id.
36. See Stephen Weitzman, Drug, Device, Cosmetic? (Part1), 24 FOOD DRUG
CoSM. L.J. 226, 230 & n.20 (1969).
37. The Food Drug and Cosmetic Act later included "medical devices" in the same
definition of "drug." See Gary E. Gamerman, Note, Intended Use and MedicalDevices:
DistinguishingNonmedical "Devices"fromMedical "Devices" Under21 U.S.C. § 32(H),
61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 806, 817 (1993). The current discussion is limited to the
evolution of the definition of "drug."
38. See Weitzman, supra note 36, at 230 n.20.

39. See id.
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diagnose disease, nor did it encompass drugs that affected the structure or
function of the body without at the same time curing disease.'
In response to these shortcomings, later bills expanded the definition
of drugs to allow the FDA to assert jurisdiction over harmful products,
including harmful weight-loss remedies.4 Despite this, the central focus
regarding drug classification was still what health-related claims a
manufacturer made about its product.42 "Drug" is currently defined in
relevant part to mean "articles (other than food) intended to affect the
structure or any function of the body of man or other animals .... ."3
This definition of "drug" has remained unchanged since its adoption in
1938." Until recently, the FDA, as well as the courts, has generally
encountered no difficulty in construing the current definition of "drug" as
one which does not encompass cigarettes. 45
B. The Case Law
The principal case regarding cigarette drug classification is Action on
Smoking and Health v. Harris,I which allowed the FDA to refrain from
regulating tobacco as a drug.47 The Action on Smoking and Health
Organization (ASH) originally petitioned the FDA to assert jurisdiction
over cigarettes containing nicotine on grounds that nicotine found within
cigarettes is a "drug," or, alternatively, that cigarettes and cigarette filters
are "medical devices" that administer nicotine to the body.4" After the
FDA refused to honor ASH's petition, ASH sought recourse from the
courts to compel the FDA to assert jurisdiction over cigarettes.4 9 On
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that the FDA's
decision to refrain from classifying tobacco as a drug was neither arbitrary
nor capricious.50 The court based its holding in part on a recognized
40. See Gamerman, supra note 37, at 817.
41. See Action on Smoking and Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236, 238 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (reviewing the legislative history of the Federal Food and Drug Act).
42. See id.
43. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C) (1995).

44. See id.
45. See discussion infra Part II.B.
46. 655 F.2d 236 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
47. See id.
48. See id. at 237. The court expressed no opinion on whether cigarettes could be
regulated as a device because this issue was ultimately decided by a separate petition.

See id. at 237 n.4.
49. See id. at 237.
50. See id. at 243.
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standard of judicial deference to administrative interpretation of statutory
language.5" In addition, the court noted that in order for a product to
achieve drug status, it must be marketed with the intent "to affect the
structure or function of the human body."52 The court stated that to
determine a product's "market intent," the FDA must look to
representations made by the manufacturer or vendor of the product. 3
Because ASH did not offer any evidence that cigarette manufacturers or
vendors represent to consumers that cigarettes are "intended to affect the
structure or function of the human body," the court concluded that the
FDA's decision to refrain from asserting jurisdiction over tobacco was
warranted.54 Thus, the court denied ASH's request to compel the FDA
to regulate cigarettes.5
The Harris holding is consistent with that of an earlier decision,
Federal Trade Commission v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. 6 In that
case, the Federal Trade Commission was not allowed to assert jurisdiction
over cigarettes as an attempt to enjoin distribution of allegedly false
cigarette advertisingY
In so holding, the federal district court
considered whether cigarettes could be classified as a drug under the
Federal Trade Commission Act.58
Because the Federal Trade
Commission Act's definition of drug was identical to that of the Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act,59 the court analyzed the legislative history of the
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act to determine whether the Federal Trade
Commission could assert jurisdiction over cigarettes as a "drug."' Like
the Harris court,6" the Liggett court determined that cigarettes could not
be classified as a drug because evidence did not suggest that cigarettes
were marketed with the intent to produce effects upon the structure of the
body.62 In addition, the Liggett court believed,63 as did the Harris
51. See id. at 237; see also United States v. Rutherford, 422 U.S. 544,553 (1979).
52. Harris, 655 F.2d at 240.
53. See id. at 238-39 (discussing National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Mathews, 557
F.2d 325, 333 (2d Cir. 1977)).

54. See id. at 240.
55. See id. at 243.
56. 108 F. Supp. 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).

57. See id. at 577.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 574.
60. See id. at 576.
61. Action on Smoking and Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236, 238 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

62. Liggett, 108 F. Supp. at 576.
63. See id. at 575.
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court,' that legislators could not have meant that any effect by a product
on bodily senses, no matter how insignificant, could alone cause a product
to be classified as a "drug," even when the product is used as the
manufacturer intended.
The Harris and Liggett decisions reflect sound policy.6' Without
such policy, turkey could be classified as a drug because it has a tendency
to produce lethargy when eaten,' and eating is presumably the purpose
for which turkey manufacturers intend their turkey products to be used.
However, both the Harris and Liggett decisions indicate that if turkey
manufacturers made explicit representations to consumers about their
products' lethargy-inducing effects, then turkey could indeed achieve drug
classification. 67 The following cases support this point.
Courts have classified tobacco as a drug in only two cases. In United
States v. 46 Cartons, More or Less, Containing Fairfax Cigarettes,6 8 the
plaintiff distributed leaflets that claimed Fairfax cigarettes were "effective
in preventing respiratory diseases, common cold, influenza, pneumonia,
acute sinusitis, acute tonsillitis, scarlet fever, whooping cough, measles,
meningitis, tuberculosis, [and] mumps."69 The leaflets also claimed that
people with heart conditions, high blood pressure, or circulatory diseases
could smoke Fairfax cigarettes without additional health risks.70
Similarly, in United States v. 354 Bulk Cartons, Trim Reducing-Aid
Cigarettes," the cigarette manufacturer claimed its cigarettes were
effective in helping consumers lose weight.' Both the Fairfax and 354
Bulk Cartons courts held that the FDA could assert jurisdiction over these
particular brands of cigarettes because of the various beneficial health
claims the manufacturers made about their products.7' Thus, both brands
of cigarettes, in the respective courts' views, were marketed with the
intent to produce effects on the body.74

64. Harris, 655 F.2d at 240.
65. See supra notes 46-64 and accompanying text.
66. See Health Foods Industry Callsfor Return of Safe Tryptophan to the Market,
PR Newswire, July 9, 1990, available in WESTLAW, HWD.
67. See supra notes 46-64 and accompanying text.
68. 113 F. Supp. 336 (D.N.J. 1953).
69. Id. at 337.

70. See id.
71.
72.
73.
74.

178 F. Supp. 847 (D.N.J. 1959).
See id. at 849.
See id. at 851; Fairfax, 113 F. Supp. at 339.
See 354 Bulk Cartons, 178 F. Supp. at 851; Fairfax, 113 F. Supp. at 339.
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III. INTENDED USE

Two ways exist by which the FDA may conceivably assert jurisdiction
over tobacco notwithstanding its prior determinations. 75 The FDA must
rely on either, or both, of the two following theories because most
cigarette manufacturers make no direct health claims to consumers about
their products.76 The first is the theory of "consumer intent."' The
second is the notion that tobacco companies know their products are
addictive and "intend" for consumers to become addicted to their products
by manipulating levels of nicotine in tobacco and, therefore, market their
products with the intent to produce bodily effects.7" This second theory
could be described as the "actual manufacturer intent" theory.79 While
both theories attempt to dodge the apparent requirement that manufacturers
make specific health claims about their products,' they are nevertheless
methods by which the "true" marketing intent of tobacco manufacturers
may be determined from factors other than the manufacturers' explicit
claims.8"
A. Consumer Intent and Actual Manufacturer Intent Theories
The theory of "consumer intent" attempts to bypass assertions made
by manufacturers by focusing on the way consumers intend to use a
product, rather than by focusing on how manufacturers explicitly intend
their products to be used.' For example, an attempt to classify tobacco
as a drug via the consumer intent theory would be to assert that smokers
intend to "affect the structure or function" of their bodies by using
tobacco to produce intended physiological effects." Since such a theory
uses as its focal point the consumer's rather than the manufacturer's
75. See discussion infra Parts ITI.A-B.

76. See discussion supra Part II.
77. See Action on Smoking and Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236, 239 (D.C. Cir.

1980).
78. See James T. O'Reilly, A Consistent Ethic of Safety Regulation: The Casefor
Improving Regulation of Tobacco Products, 3 ADMIN. L.J. 215, 230 (1989).

79. This is the author's own title for this theory.
80. See Harris, 655 F.2d at 241 (stating that "Congress has been made repeatedly
aware that the FDA cannot assert jurisdiction over cigarettes absent health claims made
by manufacturers" (citations omitted)).

81. See discussioninfra Part lII.A.
82. See Harris,655 F.2d at 239.
83. For example, people smoke to produce increased alertness and relaxation. See
Christine Gorman, Why it's So Hard to Quit Smoking, TIME, May 30, 1988, at 56.
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intent, evidence of the consumer's intent, as the Harriscourt pointed out,
must be "strong enough to justify an inference as to the vendors'
intent."' Thus, a claim made under the consumer intent theory must
nevertheless point to the "true," though hidden, intent of the
This is consistent with the policy that the
manufacturer.15
manufacturer's, and not the consumer's, intent is to be dispositive as to
whether a product is a drug.A
Like the consumer intent theory, the "actual manufacturer intent
theory," the second theory by which tobacco opponents may be able to
achieve drug classification of tobacco, reflects a policy that tobacco
manufacturers should not be allowed to shield their products from drug
classification merely by current "claims-oriented criterion. "' The basis
of the actual manufacturer intent theory is that manufacturers consciously
intend to produce physiological impacts on people addicted to tobacco,
which "evidenc[es] an intention to produce an effect on the body."88
Manufacturers intend such effects regardless of any explicit health claim,
or lack thereof, that the manufacturer makes about the product.8 9 Unlike
the consumer intent theory, the actual manufacturer intent theory does not
focus on reasons why consumers smoke, but solely on a manufacturer's
true, though hidden, intentions for marketing a product.'
B. Relative Strengths and Weaknesses of the Consumer Intent
and Actual Manufacturer Intent Theories
Both consumer intent and actual manufacturer intent theories suffer
from a similar drawback: it is well established "that the 'intended use' of
a product . . . is determined from its label, accompanying labeling,
84. Harris, 655 F.2d at 239.

85. See id.
86. Another example of a product which could possibly achieve drug status under
an overly-inclusive consumer intent rule is whipping cream containing nitrous oxide. See
Nitrous Oxide No Laughing Matterfor Bars, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1996, at
5B. Most people use whipping cream to complement foods such as pie and other
desserts, but some use whipping cream containers to achieve temporary "highs" (similar
to that experienced at the dentist's office) by sucking nitrous oxide from the whipping

cream container. See id. Inline with a proper rule of manufacturer intent, nitrous oxide
sold to dentists for use in their practice would be classified as a drug because it is
intended to be used, by manufacturers and dentists alike, for its anesthetic effect. See

id.
87. See O'Reilly, supra note 78, at 231.

88. Id. at 232 (citation omitted).
89. See id.
90. See id.
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promotional claims, [and] advertising." 9' The actual manufacturer intent
and consumer intent theories, on the other hand, do not rely on such
traditional sources. 2 Despite this, proponents of regulation argue that
those cases which have relied on specific claims by tobacco manufacturers
to decide whether cigarettes may be classified as a drug may very well be
outdated.93 At the time those cases were decided, evidence was not as
strong as it is today that cigarettes affect the structure and function of the
In fact,
body or that nicotine found in cigarette smoke is addictive.'
during the Fairfax era, it was assumed that users could stop smoking
Thus, according to proponents of regulation, current
anytime. 9
knowledge regarding the dangers of tobacco 96 indicates that courts may
be more inclined to look beyond a tobacco product's labeling and
advertising to determine a manufacturer's intent. Hence, the consumer
intent and actual manufacturer intent theories are now viewed by some as
viable theories upon which the FDA may assert jurisdiction over tobacco
products.
The consumer intent theory, again, looks directly to the reasons
people smoke in order to establish an inference of tobacco manufacturers'
market intent. Even so, the Harris court noted that to justify a theory of
consumer intent, "consumers must use the product predominantly-and in
fact nearly exclusively-with the appropriate intent before the requisite
Proponents of FDA regulation
statutory intent can be inferred. "I
attempt to meet this heavy burden by focusing on tobacco's "addictive"
qualities; classifying tobacco as addictive is a means to circumvent, or
discount, the significance of the fact that many reasons, other than
addiction, cause people to use tobacco.9"
For example, evidence suggests that teenagers use tobacco for
"psychosocial" reasons;' for teenagers, smoking is a symbolic act of
manhood or womanhood which is done to enhance the teenager's image
91. Hanson v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 30, 35 (D. Minn. 1976) (citations
omitted), aff'd 540 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1976).
92. See discussion supra Part 1ll.A.
93. See, e.g., Action on Smoking and Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236 (D.C. Cir.
1980); Federal Trade Commission v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 108 F. Supp. 573
(S.D.N.Y. 1952).
94. See Burkhard & Despard, supra note 31, at 118; see also Broder, supra note
29.
95. See O'Reilly, supra note 78, at 232 n.85.
96. See infra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
97. Harris, 655 F.2d at 240.
98. See infra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
99. See Nicotine Attack, supra note 1.
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Implicit in this theory is that teenage use of
in front of peers."t
tobacco, like teenage use of marijuana, is stimulated by the fact that it is
taboo. 01 One must also recognize the considerable amount of people
who claim to be "social smokers. " " "Social smokers" may be defined

as those "who smokeol occasionally, at certain times of the day or in
social situations.""03 There are even those who regard smoking as a
sexual fetish! °4 As a result, it would be difficult to establish that
teenagers and social smokers, who comprise a significant number of the
total amount of smokers,"° smoke with the requisite intent to "alter the

structure or function of the body" to the extent necessary to "justify an
inference" that manufacturers intend their products to be used for
primarily physiological reasons.
That this inference would be difficult to establish is demonstrated
further by the fact that a smokeless cigarette, test-marketed by R.J.
Reynolds in 1988, designed solely to deliver nicotine to the body without
100. See id.
101. SeeHearingsBeforethe Subcomm. on Transportation,Tourism, andHazardous
Materials of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 47
(1987) (statement of Sen. Sanford).
102. See Suein L. Hwang, Puffing Away, Social Smokers 'Deny' Addiction, WALL
ST. J., July 5, 1994, at B1.
103. Id.; see Sarah D. Bunting, Why Are More Students Smoking? An Unfiltered
Perspective, PRINCETON ALUMNI WKLY., Fall 1992, at 10 (on file with New York Law
School Law Review). Ms. Bunting classifies smokers into three distinct categories:
social smokers, casual smokers, and hard-core smokers. Social smokers, according to
Ms. Bunting, desire cigarettes only when they drink alcohol and, to the annoyance of
most casual and hard-core smokers, never buy their own cigarettes, but beg them off
more serious smokers. Similarly, social smokers are not concerned with particular brand
names; their goal is not to smoke as a leisurely pastime-as do casual smokers-which
would make differing flavors associated with different brands a concern. Rather, they
smoke merely from a desire to have "something to hold onto." Ms. Bunting's analysis
carries with it an important implication: the "social" smoker is indeed engaging in social,
not habitual or addictive, behavior. For social smokers, the desire to grasp a cigarette
during social events arises not from physical addiction but from the hope to cast a certain
social image: holding a cigarette while drinking alcohol is a ritual which, perhaps,
enables the social smoker to gain acceptance among the community of casual and hardcore smokers. See id.; see also Interview with Sarah M. Bunting, Gentlemen of Leisure
(Manhattan Neighborhood Network television cablecast, Oct. 15, 1996); Sarah M.
Bunting, Remarks, Moist Towelette (Manhattan Neighborhood Network television
cablecast, Jan. 5, 1997).
104. See Suein L. Hwang, Drag Queens: Paula Puffs and Her Fans Watch,
Enraptured: 'Smoxploitation' Films Signal That Smoking is Becoming a Fetish Among
Many, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 1996, at Al.
105. See Hwang, supra note 102.
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other harmful tobacco byproducts, was a complete failure. °6 Again,
this suggests that other factors, such as taste, smell, the amount of time
to light, and the thickness of exhaled smoke, do play an important role in
the smoking ritual,"0 7 regardless of whether tobacco is addictive.
But if tobacco is addictive, the subjective reasons why people
smoke-to enjoy the flavor of tobacco, to socialize, to rebel'S-become
illusory; no matter what a particular smoker's subjective intent for
smoking, many smokers may be addicted to nicotine without even
knowing or admitting it, 1" in which case the smoker's "true" intent may
indeed be to "affect the structure or function of the[] bod[y]."10 Thus,
finding that tobacco is addictive is a necessary step in the FDA's analysis,
even though most drugs regulated by the agency are not addictive.' 11
Evidence now suggests that nicotine is as addictive as heroin;" 2 and
for teenagers, evidence indicates that tobacco is more addictive than other
If that is the case, even though teenagers and others
drugs."'

presumably begin smoking for social reasons, "individual choice to initiate
the use of tobacco products is soon eclipsed by the individual's inability
106. See Barnaby J. Feder, Philip Morris Responds to Memo, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
10, 1995, § 1, at 40.
107. See Betsy Morris & Alix M. Freedman, 'Smokeless' Cigarette is Expected to
Pose Big Marketing Challenge, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 1987, at 39.
108. See Burkhard & Despard, supra note 31, at 119.
109. For an analysis in laymen's terms of how nicotine actually affects physiological
functions of the body, see id.
110. Id.
111. Aspirin, to take a common example, is not addictive, and is regulated by the
FDA. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.63, 201.314 (labeling requirements). But unlike
tobacco, one would be hard-pressed to think of any use for aspirin other than to affect
the structure or function of the body-to relieve headaches, to prevent heart aneurysms,
et cetera. Furthermore, aspirin is explicitly marketed to affect the structure and function
of the body, so the FDA need not even resort to a consumer intent theory to assert
jurisdiction over it. So why must cigarettes then be addictive for the FDA to regulate
them? Precisely for the reasons stated: if cigarettes are not addictive, more weight
attaches to the subjective reasons why people smoke; more merit is attached to a
smoker's assertion that he or she smokes, for example, to enjoy the flavor of tobacco.
However, if cigarettes are addictive, the subjective reasons why people smoke become
subordinated to the actual reason: to satisfy an addiction.
112. Health Consequences of Smoking: Nicotine Addiction: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 166 (1988) (statement of Dr. John Slade).
113. See id.
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to readily cease use because of the brain's strong addiction to cigarette

smoke. "114
While an official acknowledgement that tobacco is addictive may be
conducive to a theory of consumer intent, the theory nevertheless has
drawbacks, especially in light of the requirement that there must be a
substantial showing that consumers use a product "nearly exclusively" to
alter the structure or function of the body in order for the inference
required under a consumer intent theory to be made properly." 5 In
addition, courts have accorded the FDA less deference when the it has
attempted to regulate products based on consumer intent." 6
Additionally, when an administrative agency has actually changed its
position from a prior determination, as the FDA has now done since its
position in the Harris case, the agency is likewise accorded less
deference." 7 These factors, along with recognized conflicting reasons
why consumers use tobacco,"' will make it difficult for the FDA to
muster enough evidence to establish an inference, under a consumer intent
theory, that tobacco companies indeed market their products with the
intent to "affect the structure or function of the body."
While empirical evidence regarding smokers' true intentions, on its
own, may be helpful to justify a theory of consumer intent, it is
insufficient to establish a theory of actual manufacturer intent. If tobacco
is addictive by its very nature, then it was just as addictive forty years ago
as it is today." 9 Yet forty years ago, no one could argue that tobacco
manufacturers marketed their products with the intent to cause
physiological effects in smokers, because the extent of such effects were
unknown."' Thus, the mere empirical discovery that a substance,
114. O'Reilly, supra note 78, at 219.
115. Action on Smoking and Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236, 239-40 (D.C. Cir.

1980).
116. See National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Mathews, 557 F.2d 325, 334-36 (2d
Cir. 1977); Millet, Pit & Seed Co. v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 84, 89 n.4 (E.D.
Tenn. 1977), vacated on other grounds 627 F.2d 1093 (6th Cir. 1980).
117. See Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 417 (1993) (quoting
NLRB v. Iron Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 351 (1978)).

118. See supra text accompanying notes 99-107.
119. Of course, many contend that tobacco companies intentionally alter nicotine
levels in cigarettes, which may support the contention that tobacco is more addictive

today than it was forty years ago. See Susan H. Carchman, Should the FDA Regulate
Nicotine-ContainingCigarettes?Has the Agency Establisheda Legal Basis and, If Not,
Should Congress Grant It?, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 85, 131 (1996). However, even if

this is true, it does not significantly detract from the validity of the argument presented
here, which is conceptually rather than empirically based.

120. See supra text accompanying notes 94-95.
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tobacco, is addictive, can shed light on why smokers smoke, but it does
not automatically follow that cigarette manufacturers market their products
with a different intention today than they did forty years ago.
However, evidence that tobacco companies have long known about the
addictive qualities of nicotine, and have attempted to cover up this
knowledge,"' offers proponents of tobacco regulation better ammunition
under a theory of actual manufacturer intent than evidence of consumers'
reasons for using tobacco. If tobacco companies have possessed inside
information regarding the addictive quality of nicotine, and have actually
manipulated levels of nicotine in tobacco to make cigarettes more addictive
than they were before," the theory of actual manufacturer intent would
be strengthened.
The actual manufacturer intent theory has two strains, as formulated
by the FDA. First, the FDA claims "that an intent to affect the structure
or function of the body can be established by evidence showing that...
the manufacturer 'has in mind' that the product will be used by consumers
for pharmacological purposes .... "123 The second strain is that "the
manufacturer has 'designed' the product to provide pharmacological
effects" in smokers
which also, in turn, points toward the industry's true
"market intent.""2 4 Both strains are backed by evidence in the form of
internal statements and documents of tobacco companies." z
In its legal analysis, the FDA claims that the first strain, that the
tobacco industry "has in mind" that its products will be used by
consumers for pharmacological purposes, would be sufficient by itself to
regulate tobacco as a drug, even without allegations of the second
strain."z By using the phrase "has in mind," the FDA suggests that the
knowledge possessed by the tobacco industry regarding the characteristics
of nicotine is so great that that knowledge alone rises to a level of "market
intent" sufficient to trigger FDA regulation. But this is a questionable
position because producers of other products not regulated-or
regulable-by the FDA "have in mind" that their products produce
pharmacological effects in consumers. Alcoholic beverages are an
121. See Broder, supra note 29 (stating that Liggett will "turn over thousands of
pages of internal documents that the attorneys general believe will prove their charge that
the industry has for decades carried out a conspiracy of silence and deceit"); see also
Feder, supra note 106.

122. See Carchman, supra note 119, at 131.
123. Nicotine in Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Is a Drug and These Products
Are Nicotine Delivery Devices Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 61
Fed. Reg. 44,848 (Dep't Health & Human Servs. 1996) (jurisdictional determination).

124. Id.
125. See id. at 44,847-50.

126. See id. at 44,849.
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example. Winemakers, for instance, know their products will cause
certain effects in drinkers, whether consumers drink to complement a meal
or to become intoxicated. The FDA does regulate alcohol in certain
circumstances, such as when used as an ingredient in a drug which
produces medicinal benefits. 27 But would the FDA be able to assert
jurisdiction over alcohol used as a beverage if it so desired? Probably not.
Alcohol is not marketed to produce pharmacological effects, but primarily
as a beverage with a taste to be enjoyed while eating or watching football
games. Thus, as with tobacco, the FDA would have to resort to an
alternative theory such as consumer intent or actual manufacturer intent
in order to regulate alcohol.
Consumer intent theory would prove inadequate to regulate alcohol.
Alcohol is regarded as even less addictive than tobacco; in fact, alcohol
is addictive only to a small percentage of people. 28 Thus, a major
source of attack open to tobacco-that despite subjective claims of intent,
the "true" intent of smokers is to feed addiction-is generally not available
with respect to alcohol. More legitimacy is thereby accorded to differing
reasons why people drink than to differing reasons why people smoke. As
a result, a consumer intent theory would be even less likely to allow the
FDA to assert jurisdiction over alcohol than it would over cigarettes.
Similarly, the FDA would be unable to regulate alcohol based on
actual manufacturer intent theory. Like cigarettes, the addictive substance
in alcoholic beverages is manipulated by manufacturers. For example,
levels of alcohol in wine are both in theory and practice easily
manipulated by choosing a particular grade of yeast, harvesting grapes at
a particular sugar level, or simply adding water. 2 9 However, unlike
cigarette manufacturers, winemakers manipulate alcohol levels for two
primary reasons: to give the wine a particular taste and body, and to keep
the wine below a certain alcohol level in order to avoid an increase in
excise tax. Such manipulation is not intended to cause drinkers to become
addicted to alcohol products, making actual manufacturer intent theory
unavailable to the FDA to regulate alcoholic beverages as a drug.
This comparison to alcohol demonstrates the frailty of the FDA's
position: merely because a manufacturer "has in mind" that a product
causes pharmacological effects does not, by itself, allow the FDA to
regulate such a product as a drug. A stronger connection must be shown.
Despite its assertion to the contrary, the FDA is probably aware of this,
because it resorts to an analysis of the internal documents and research of
several major tobacco companies-Philip Morris, R.J. Reynolds, and
127. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 328 (1996). Section 328 regulates "over-the-counter
drug products intended for oral ingestion that contain alcohol." Id.
128. See Carchman, supra note 119, at 134.

129. The author is a former winemaker and writes from his own experience.
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Brown & Williamson-that show these companies were themselves
interested in nicotine's pharmacological effects and have been aware of
nicotine's addictive qualities for decades. 3 ' Based on the volume of
information the FDA has obtained, the agency's position seems wellfounded that "these uncontested studies demonstrate that the entire
cigarette industry had detailed knowledge of the pharmacological effects
of nicotine on the brain, including knowledge of research funded by the
industry that found nicotine to be an addictive drug. "131 However, the
FDA fails to explain the basis for its inference that because the tobacco
industry "has in mind" that nicotine produces certain effects and that
consumers smoke tobacco in order to bring about these effects, "the
evidence is thereby sufficient to establish that the effects of cigarettes on
function of the body are 'intended' by the
the structure and
2
3
1
manufacturers."
How does the FDA attempt to justify such an inference? As
demonstrated, merely because a manufacturer has knowledge that its
product may cause certain physiological effects does not automatically
make that product susceptible to FDA regulation.'3 3 But to make the
necessary jump from a demonstration of the tobacco industry's
"knowledge" to a demonstration of the industry's "market intent," the
FDA points only toward more and more examples of the tobacco
The FDA demonstrates no independent
industry's "knowledge."'"
evidence linking the industry's "knowledge" to its alleged "market intent,"
other than the "knowledge" itself.
There are many possible reasons why the tobacco industry has
engaged in such extensive research into the properties of nicotine.
Perhaps the industry initiated research with the well-intentioned aim of
knowing all they could about their product. The industry's research was
also contemporaneous with outside research;' 35 perhaps the industry
wanted to seek the opinions of its own researchers to corroborate or deny
the findings of outside researchers. Furthermore, the FDA concentrated
their research primarily on the largest cigarette companies, which could
Does that mean smaller tobacco
afford such extensive research.
companies that have never researched the properties of nicotine cannot be
regulated? What if Hershey decided to research the physiological effects
of chocolate? Would that automatically change Hershey's "market intent"
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

See 61 Fed. Reg. 44,854-94.
Id. at 44,911.
Id. at 44,912.
See supra text accompanying notes 126-29.
61 Fed. Reg. 44,912-15.
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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such that chocolate could be regulated as a drug? And finally, as referred
to earlier, tobacco has been marketed for years, even before it was known
to be possibly addictive; that tobacco companies then discover and
research the addictive qualities of nicotine is not itself evidence that their
market intent is any different after the discovery and research than it was
before.
A major source of loose ends in the FDA's regulatory approach to
tobacco is that the FDA is departing from its traditional approach to drug
regulation, which has been confined to products explicitly marketed to
provide some sort of medical benefit. Indeed, based on the FDA's own
approach to alcohol, only when alcohol is used to confer some medical
benefit does the FDA choose to regulate it.'36 Were the FDA suddenly
to attempt to regulate alcohol as a drug when used as a beverage, it would
be a bold-and, as demonstrated by the discussion above, probably
unsuccessful-departure from its previous regulatory policy. To regulate
tobacco as a drug would be a similar departure from the FDA's general
approach to regulating drugs, simply because tobacco is not within the
traditional scope of "medicinal" drugs.
Yet an administrative agency is given deference if it reasonably
interprets statutory language.' 3 7 It follows that courts have recognized
actual manufacturer intent theory as a possible option for the FDA to
regulate potentially harmful substances. 138 Thus, in light of the
weakness of all other approaches to regulating tobacco as a drug, the only
practicable avenue left available to the FDA is the second strain of the
actual manufacturer intent theory: that the tobacco industry has "designed"
cigarettes to provide pharmacological effects in smokers. According to
this strain of the FDA's approach, tobacco manufacturers' nicotine
alteration in cigarettes infers an intent to affect the structure or function
of the body.' 39
But such a means to assert jurisdiction over tobacco products has
drawbacks. First, even if tobacco companies manipulate levels of
nicotine, it is hasty to infer that they do so with the "intent" to affect the
structure or function of the body. Much of the evidence discussed by the
FDA, while tending to show that major tobacco companies are indeed
concerned with nicotine dosage in cigarettes, involves primarily the
136. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
137. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
138. See United States v. 46 Cartons, More or Less, Containing Fairfax Cigarettes,
113 F. Supp. 336 (D.N.J. 1953).
139. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44,950.
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development of low-tar cigarettes. 140 For example, the FDA identifies
several ways by which nicotine may be manipulated, including "the use
of nicotine-rich tobacco blends in low-tar cigarettes" and "the use of
filtration and ventilation technologies that selectively remove more tar
from smoke than nicotine .
"...,141
The FDA also refers to a product
being test-marketed by R.J. Reynolds, called "Eclipse," which "is
intended to rely primarily on heating rather than burning tobacco and to
deliver levels of nicotine similar to a conventional ultra-low-tar

cigarette. "142
But are these techniques enough to show the requisite statutory intent?
Aside from delivering a pharmacological effect, nicotine plays an
important role in the taste, odor, and "mouth satisfaction" of a
cigarette."
Thus, when manipulating levels of nicotine in cigarettes,
cigarette companies are concerned about maintaining the taste of a
cigarette as the tar level goes down;'" cigarette manufacturers know that
to sell their product, they must provide consumers with a satisfying
smoke. While one ingredient to a "satisfying smoke" is apparently the
physical satisfaction derived from nicotine, the same may be said for
alcoholic beverages, and even coffee. Manufacturers of cigarettes,
alcohol, and coffee may have a variety of "intents" in marketing and
manufacturing their products. Yet merely because these products produce
some physical "effect," which is one facet of their "consumer appeal," is
not sufficient to justify the FDA to regulate them as drugs. Otherwise,
alcohol and coffee would be easily regulable by the FDA. Again, the
weakness of the FDA's non-traditional approach is evident: products not
explicitly marketed to produce specific medical benefits are difficult for
the FDA to regulate; cigarettes and other consumer products like alcohol
and coffee may be marketed with a variety of "intents" and used by
consumers for a variety of reasons.
Another drawback to actual manufacturer intent theory is that there
are currently many brands of cigarettes which claim to be one hundred
percent natural. 45 Manufacturers of "natural" tobacco claim that their
product is free of many harmful additives allegedly present in cigarettes
produced by the large tobacco conglomerates. 46 "Natural" cigarettes
140. See id. at 44,918.
141. Id. at 44,951.

142. Id. at 44,927-28; see also supra text accompanying notes 106-07 (regarding
another smokeless cigarette).
143. 61 Fed. Reg. 44,924-25.

144. See id.
at 44,922-24.
145. See Kristi Turnquist, Blowing Smoke, OREGONIAN, Feb. 26, 1996, at C1.

146. See id.
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are also purported to be manufactured without manipulation of nicotine
levels. 47 If the FDA were to justify regulation of cigarettes on the
grounds that cigarette manufacturers manipulate levels of nicotine in
tobacco, an increasingly significant portion of the market would, and
should, be allowed to continue selling tobacco products unencumbered by
4
FDA regulation. This would defeat the purpose of FDA regulation 1
altogether because teenagers could still be exposed to these brands of
"natural" tobacco. Also, these smaller "natural" tobacco companies could
exploit the opportunity to increase their market share as the larger tobacco
companies would be required to comply with strict FDA guidelines.
Finally, it is conceivable that large tobacco companies could avoid
regulation simply by refraining from manipulating levels of nicotine in
cigarettes.
Actual manufacturer intent theory is stronger than its consumer intent
counterpart, insofar as it attempts to strike directly at the actual
motivations of those who market tobacco, instead of arriving at such
manufacturer intent by a convoluted detour through various social,
physical, and psychological reasons why consumers smoke. 149 Yet drug
classification altogether suffers from a tremendous side-effect: if cigarettes
are regulated as drugs, the FDA would be required to ban them from the
market absent a showing that cigarettes are safe and effective. 5 ' And,
the FDA's current plan to regulate cigarettes as a "medical device" suffers
from many of the same potential problems as drug classification, including
the likelihood of a ban on cigarettes.
IV. CIGARETTES AS MEDICAL DEVICES

To assert jurisdiction over cigarettes, the FDA attempts to classify
cigarettes as a medical device because "they deliver a drug-namely,
nicotine-to the bloodstream."'
Under the FDCA, a medical device
means an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine,
contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related
article . . . which is
(1) recognized in the official National Formulary, or the
United States Pharmacopeia, or any supplement to them,
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

See id.
See discussion supra Part I.
See supra notes 82-120 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., MacLachlan, supra note 19, at A21.
Id.
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(2) intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other
conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of
disease, in man or other animals, or
(3) intended to affect the structure or any function of the
body of man or other animals .... 152
Presumably, the third provision, that "medical devices" includes articles
intended to affect the structure or function of the human body, is what will
allow the FDA to obtain jurisdiction over cigarettes as a medical device,
because the first two provisions are not applicable.' 5 3 Consequently, in
order to regulate cigarettes as a medical device, the FDA must meet the
same burdens with respect to manufacturer intent as is necessary to
classify cigarettes as a drug.'"
The FDA wishes to regulate cigarettes as a medical device instead of
as a drug because, according to the agency, the FDA could exert authority
over the advertising, sale, and other aspects of the cigarette market
without being forced to impose an all-out ban. 55 Specifically, the FDA
relies on a provision of the MDA, which applies to "restricted
devices."'6 That provision allows the FDA to require, by regulation,
that a device be restricted to sale, distribution, or use(A) only upon the written or oral authorization of a
practitioner licensed by law to administer or use such device, or
(B) upon such other conditions as the Secretary may prescribe
in such regulation,
if, because of its potentiality for harmful effect[s] . . . the
Secretary determines that there cannot otherwise be reasonable
assurance of its safety and effectiveness.'5 7
The provision, "other conditions as the secretary may prescribe," is what
the FDA claims would give it the authority to regulate cigarettes without
152. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (1994).
153. See United States v. 354 Bulk Cartons, Trim Reducing Aid Cigarettes, 178 F.

Supp. 847, 851 (D.N.J. 1953).
154. The legislative intent regarding medical device classification as it relates to
manufacturer claims is essentially the same as that of the legislative intent regarding
drugs; for example, the focus of inquiry as to whether a device is intended to affect the

structure or function of the human body centers on claims made by the manufacturer.
See Gamerman, supra note 37, at 817.
155. See MacLachlan, supra note 19, A21.

156. See id.; 21 U.S.C. § 360j(e)(1) (1995).
157. 21 U.S.C. § 360j(e)(1) (emphasis added).
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banning them. 5 This provision also would presumably allow the FDA
to exempt cigarettes from other requirements applicable to other medical
devices, including the requirement that medical device manufacturers
report to the FDA adverse reactions to their products, plus certain premarket approval requirements. 59 Thus, according to the FDA, the
MDA will enable the agency to adopt the rules now at issue regarding
teenage tobacco
use" without causing cigarettes to be banned
6
altogether.' '
But a closer look at the regulatory scheme for medical devices shows
that the FDA's confidence that cigarettes need not be banned is misplaced.
Under the MDA, a device first brought under the regulatory jurisdiction
of the FDA is subject to "general controls."
"General controls" are
applicable to all devices regulated by the FDA and include
adulteration 63 and misbranding provisions;" recordkeeping, labeling,
and reporting requirements;' 6 and good manufacturing provisions. 11
Next, the FDA must "classify" a device into one of three categories 67
by appointing a panel of experts "who are qualified by training and
6
experience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of the device."
Class I devices are devices for which general controls are sufficient to
reasonably assure their safety and effectiveness. 69 Class II devices are
devices for which general controls are insufficient to provide reasonable
assurance of their safety and effectiveness and therefore must be subject
to special controls. 7
Special controls include the promulgation of
performance standards and the issuance of guidelines. 7 ' Class III
devices are devices which "present a potential unreasonable risk of illness
or injury" and whose safety and effectiveness cannot be assured by either
158. Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless
Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,406 (1996).
159. See MacLachlan, supra note 19, A21.

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

See id.
See id.
See 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,404.
See 21 U.S.C. §§ 342, 351 (1994).
See id. § 343.
See id.
§ 360i.
See id.
§ 352.
See id.
§ 360c(b)(1).
Id.
§ 360c(b)(2).
See id. § 360c(a)(1)(A).
See id.
§ 360c(a)(1)(B).
See id.
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the general controls of Class I devices or the special controls of Class II
devices. 1
Class III devices, therefore, are subject to pre-market
approval,173 and pre-market approval must be denied if there is a lack
of reasonable assurance that a device is safe and effective for its intended
or suggested use.' 74 Furthermore, even products currently on the
market can be subject to pre-market approval.175 As noted previously,
this is a requirement that cigarettes will likely fail to meet.
One can now begin to see the problem with regulating cigarettes as
medical devices: a panel of experts assigned to evaluate the "safety and
effectiveness" of cigarettes will likely find that cigarettes constitute a
"potential for unreasonable risk of illness or injury" and thereby subject
cigarettes to pre-market approval requirements as Class III medical
devices. Cigarettes must then be safe under the conditions of its suggested
use in order to avoid being denied pre-market approval.
The FDA resorts to several weak, and perhaps insincere, arguments
in an attempt to dodge this predicament. First, the agency claims it
"intends to classify cigarettes . . . at a future time, and will impose any
additional requirements that apply as a result of their classification." 76
The FDA further states that "[t]he classification process is the time at
which the agency determines what degree of regulation is necessary to
provide a 'reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness' for a
particular product . . . . However, the act does not specify the timing of
the application of device authorities . . . ."" Does the FDA believe it
can simply assert general pre-classification controls over cigarettes and
then refrain from classifying them in order to avoid pre-market approval
requirements? Surely, the agency could not entertain such a belief; as the
78
act explicitly states, "the Secretary shall classify all . . . devices."'
While the FDA is not required to classify devices at any particular time,
if the agency delays classification, public interest groups may challenge
such selective enforcement. 79 Consequently, were a manufacturer of
cigarettes then required to secure pre-market approval, it must be shown
that the product is safe and effective for its intended use." s
172. Id. § 360c(a)(1)(C).
173. See id.

174. See id. § 360e(d)(2)(A)-(B).
175. See id. § 360e(b)(1).
176. 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,404.
177. Id. at 44,405.

178. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(b)(1) (emphasis added).
179. See MacLachlan, supra note 19.
180. See id.
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The FDA nevertheless believes it can avoid taking cigarettes off the
market when cigarettes are eventually classified, despite the wellrecognized detriment cigarettes cause to public health. The agency states
that in a classification proceeding, it will consider
both the known risks of tobacco products and the public health
concerns that could be raised by withdrawal from the market of
cigarettes... to which many adults are addicted.
• . .The sudden withdrawal from the market of products to
which so many millions of people are addicted would be
dangerous.'
In a
The permissibility of such a consideration is questionable.
classification proceeding, the safety and effectiveness of a device is
determined in part by "weighing any probable benefit to health from the
use of the device against any probable risk of injury or illness from such
use.""s Yet by considering withdrawal symptoms that smokers may
experience when terminating the use of cigarettes, the FDA would be
ignoring Congress's command; the agency would be weighing the
"benefits" of the use of cigarettes against the detriments of the non-use of
cigarettes. Nowhere in the statutory provision which defines the factors
the FDA must consider in determining "safety and effectiveness" does
Congress allow the FDA to weigh any effect of the non-use of a

device. 1 3

While the agency does not seem to recognize this problem, it does
offer another avenue of escape from the possibility that tobacco products
may be subject to removal from the market. The FDA claims that a basis
exists "for finding that [tobacco products] are 'effective' for adults who
are addicted to tobacco products because such products sustain with great
efficacy the individual's continued need for the active ingredient
Such a consideration would comply with the statutory
nicotine."" s
command in that it weighs the known risks of tobacco use with a benefit
of use-preventing withdrawal symptoms. Yet even if the agency were
allowed to consider withdrawal symptoms in this light, no solid guarantee
exists that at a future time the "benefits" associated with preventing
withdrawal would be found to "outweigh" the many risks tobacco is wellknown to possess. Also, a puzzling question arises by drawing an analogy
181. 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,412-13.
182. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(2)(C) (emphasis added).

183. See id. § 360c(a)(2)(A)-(C).
184. 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,413.
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to heroin: Do the "benefits" of using heroin to prevent heroin withdrawal
It is at best
justify making heroin legally available to addicts?
questionable, as a matter of social policy, to allow the use of a substance
merely because that substance relieves its own withdrawal symptoms.
Even if tobacco products were ultimately classified as Class I medical
devices, (which would be unlikely), problems would still endure. While
tobacco products would not face the possibility of removal from the
market in the wake of pre-market approval requirements, they would
likely be subject to recall under section 360h(e)(1) of title 21 of the United
States Code, which is a general control provision applicable to all medical
devices. Section 360h(e)(1) requires
[i]f the Secretary finds that there is a reasonable probability
that a device intended for human use would cause serious,
adverse health consequences or death, the Secretary shall issue an
order requiring the appropriate person (including manufacturers,
importers, distributors, or retailers of the device)cease distribution
of such
(A) to immediately
device .... 185
Thus, no matter how the FDA tries to avoid a ban on the distribution of
tobacco products, it will be difficult to escape the many sources of attack
available to those who wish to stop cigarette manufacturing altogether, i"6
even if tobacco products are subject to the most lenient standards
applicable to medical devices.
V. ALTERNATIVES

One way to solve the various problems surrounding efforts by the
FDA to assert jurisdiction over tobacco is for Congress simply to grant the
FDA such powers. In fact, some experts believe that the FDA is taking
action merely to induce Congress to take action by placing more
restrictions on cigarette advertising to minors."s Were Congress to act
in such a way, many of the concerns addressed by the new FDA
rules-specifically, the problem of teenage smoking-could be dealt with
without jeopardizing the existence of the tobacco industry. If Congress
grants express authority to the FDA to regulate the tobacco industry,
Congress can also limit the agency's regulatory jurisdiction to the
185. 21 U.S.C. § 360h(e)(1).
186. See, e.g., supra notes 162-85 and accompanying text.

187. See MacLachlan, supra note 19, at A21.
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manufacture, promotion, advertisement, and labeling of tobacco
products. 18 Also, if explicit regulatory parameters were granted to the
FDA by Congress, the risk that the FDA could be persuaded by public
interest to apply to cigarettes the same restrictions that apply to other
products, whether drugs or medical devices, would be minimized.'89
Explicit Congressional delegation of regulatory power to the FDA would
also limit the need to litigate the issue of whether the FDA may assert
jurisdiction over tobacco.
A bill that was introduced in Congress in the spring of 1993 provides
some insight and solid recommendations concerning the present concern
over teenage smoking. That bill, the Fairness in Tobacco and Nicotine
Regulation Act of 1993 (FTNR), 1' failed after its main drafter and
advocate, Representative Mike Synar of Oklahoma, lost his bid for reelection to Congress in 1994. T'' However, a portion of the bill, known
as the "Synar Amendment," 19' was added to the Public Health Services
Under the FTNR, the FDA would be given regulatory
Act. 19
jurisdiction over the manufacture, promotion, advertisement, and labeling
of tobacco products. "9 At the same time, however, the bill specifically
does not ban tobacco products. "9 The legislation's proposed provisions
include: (1) establishing a federal minimum age of eighteen for buying
tobacco products; (2) banning distribution of free samples and discount
coupons, which would include a ban on sponsorship of athletic, cultural,
or other public events if the tobacco company's logo is displayed; (3)
requiring that cigarette containers list all chemical additives and other
components of the product and smoke; and (4) prohibiting products from
carrying direct or implicit health claims unless approved. ' Many of
188. See Matthew Baldini, Comment, The Cigarette Battle: Anti-Smoking
Proponents Go for the Knockout, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 348, 360-61 (1995).

189. See MacLachlan, supra note 19, at A21.
190. H.R. 2147, 103rd Cong. (1993).
191. See Keith White, Synar'sFinalYearFilled with Disappointments,Gannet News
Service, Dec. 21, 1994, available in 1994 WL 11246245.
192. Pub. L. No. 102-321, 106 Stat. 378 (1992) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300x-26)
(requiring that a State only be given a grant pursuant to the Public Health Services Act

if the State has in effect a law that prohibits the sale or distribution of tobacco products
to any individual under the age of 18).
193. 42 U.S.C. §§ 201-300bbb.
194. See FDA and Tobacco, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 14, 1993, at A18.
195. See Scott D. Ballin, Put Tobacco Regulation Under the FDA, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Oct. 13, 1994, at 19.

196. See FDA and Tobacco, supra note 194.
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these proposals are similar to the rules promulgated by the FDA. 'I The
FDA rules, however, are more narrowly tailored to the issue of teenage
smoking.19 s
Yet no matter what the ultimate proposals, giving the FDA a specific
framework within which to regulate tobacco would afford Congress,
tobacco companies, and the public the opportunity to voice their concerns
to achieve a level of regulation that is palatable to all. For example, the
FDA could be allowed to exert more stringent advertising controls on
tobacco products and to require more disclosure on warning labels, while
the right to sue tobacco companies could be expressly limited by Congress
through pre-emption. 19
Congressionally-imposed economic options
should also be investigated as opposed to achieving these goals'
through FDA regulation. For example, a graduated tax, which would
require higher taxes to be paid on products containing more tar, nicotine,
or other chemicals, could be imposed.2"' This "would theoretically
promote production and consumption of relatively safer tobacco
products."'
Similarly, evidence shows that tax increases on tobacco
products encourage people to stop smoking. 2 3 And, outside the federal
level, several states have successfully imposed tougher enforcement
policies on the sale of tobacco to minors.'
Similarly, the Synar
Amendment to the Public Health Law requires that states reduce the
amount of tobacco sold to minors in order to avoid a decrease in federal
grants.'
These are all options that Congress should consider as
alternatives to granting the FDA jurisdiction over tobacco.

197. See discussion supra Part I.
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199. See Clara Sue Ross, Comment, JudicialandLegislativeControlof the Tobacco
Industry: Toward a Smoke-Free Society?, U. CIN. L. REv. 317, 339 (1987).

200. See id. at 340.
201. See id. at 338.
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203. See id. at 337 (stating that "[a]n eight cent per pack tobacco tax increase would

encourage an estimated 1.8 million persons either to quit smoking or not to start
smoking, while a sixteen cent increase would have the same effect on an estimated 3.5
million Americans").
204. See, e.g., Bob Petrie, Youth Cigarette Sting Results in Fewer Violations in
Tempe, ARiz. REPuBLIC, Feb. 18, 1995, at 8.
205. See id.
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CONCLUSION

While there are several ways the FDA could conceivably assert
jurisdiction over tobacco products, all would require either a broadening
of regulatory and administrative principles developed by the courts,
Congress, and the FDA itself, or a substantial showing of evidence that
tobacco companies or consumers intend tobacco to be used to affect the
structure or function of the body.'
A much easier way for the FDA
to regulate tobacco would be for Congress to give it express authority to
do so; this would also allow the FDA to regulate tobacco without being
required to completely ban tobacco products. 7 Many options exist as
alternatives to administrative regulation," ° which Congress should
consider when adopting a framework for combatting the pervasive
problem of teenage smoking.
Phillip Rohde Costello
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